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Will Access Regulation Work?
Gerald R. Faulhaber*
The premise of this panel is that the FCC is transitioning from a rate
regulation regime to an access regime. A rate regulation regime gives all
customers full access to network facilities (common carrier) at regulated
rates-generally, rate base rate of return regulation. An access regime is
one in which all competitors are given full access to incumbents' networks,
with little or no retail rate regulation, thereby allowing competition (over
incumbents' networks) to discipline the market. Is this a good idea? Is it
likely to work? What is the evidence for this?
At the core of this transition is the idea that incumbent monopolies
control bottleneck facilities, such as local loops or cable IP channels,'
which make facilities-based competitive entry difficult, at least in the short
run. Such control will almost surely lead to well-known inefficiencies of
monopoly. Can public policy help? Traditionally, regulatory agencies were
established (e.g., telephone, airlines, trucking, electric power) that tightly
regulated retail prices and entry, often establishing social objectives that
were incompatible with competitive markets. For the first two-thirds of the
twentieth century, rate base rate of return regulation was perceived as a
necessary government intervention to solve the natural monopoly/essential
facilities problem and improve social welfare.
* Professor Emeritus of Business and Public Policy, and Management, Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania, and Professor Emeritus, Penn Law School.
1. We are assuming that the monopoly controls a physical facility, such as an access
line, which is difficult, costly, or impossible to duplicate. In contrast to this supply-side
bottleneck facility, there may also be demand-side market restrictions, such as those that
occur with (irremedial) network effects, in which customers must use a common standard or
protocol to communicate with one another, and a single firm controls that standard or
protocol. Microsoft's control of Windows is an oft-cited example as is AOL's control of its
Instant Messaging platform. We do not consider demand-side barriers in this Article,
focusing only on supply-side essential facilities.
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During the last third of the twentieth century, political scientists and
economists undertook a major revision of this perceived wisdom, showing
that in industry after industry, regulation maintained monopolies,
inefficient price structures, and reduced incentives to innovate. In some
industries, such as airlines, analysts saw a competitive industry struggling
to emerge from the "dead hand of regulation"; 3 in others, scholars
recommended deregulating parts of the industry and isolating the natural
monopoly, where it could be regulated safely with access to all in the
competitive sector. More generally, scholars argued that the cure of
regulation may be worse than the disease of monopoly.
4
In the face of this withering critique of traditional rate base rate of
return regulation, regulators sought alternative ways to achieve the public
policy objective of the control of monopoly power without the stultifying
reach of bureaucratic regulation. Obviously, the best outcome could be
achieved with competition, but if the presence of bottleneck facilities made
competition impractical, then some form of regulation, it is argued, is
needed-just not the oppressive rate base rate of return regulation.
One candidate for regulatory reform is to focus on the actual
bottleneck facility itself, and to mandate that the owner of the bottleneck
facility make it available to all firms, including, and especially, its
competitors, at "reasonable" rates and terms of trade. Regulators took a
page from classic antitrust, which for many years recognized the "essential
facilities" doctrine. First affirmed in Terminal Railroad,5 Richard Posner
describes it:
A consortium of 14 of the 24 railroads that shipped freight across the
Mississippi River at St. Louis got control of the terminal facilities at
each side of the river. The Supreme Court, while assuming that the
operation of these facilities as a single entity was the most efficient
way to operate them (that is, they comprised a natural monopoly), held
that the Sherman Act required the consortium to provide access to the
2. The focus here, and throughout this paper, is economic regulation, in which a
regulator controls the price, entry, and investment decisions of all market participants. This
is in contrast to so-called social regulation, such as environmental regulation, occupational
safety and health, banking, and air safety regulations, which are not the focus of this paper.
3. James Q. Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1971,
at 39.
4. A good starting point in the vast scholarship on regulation is JAMES Q. WILSON, THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980). A very simple model of how even "perfect" political
regulation of a natural monopoly can be significantly more inefficient than unconstrained
monopoly is in Gerald R. Faulhaber, Voting on Prices: The Political Economy of
Regulation, in INTERCONNECTION AND THE INTERNET: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1996
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE, 275 (Greg Rosston & David
Waterman eds., 1997).
5. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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terminal facilities to the 10 other railroads on nondiscriminatory
terms.
6
The essential facilities doctrine promised a magic bullet for the cure
of natural monopoly: remove the power of the owner of the bottleneck to
throttle competition via its control of that facility so that competition can
flourish unfettered by the monopolist. Simply prizing open the bottleneck
facility would allow the competitive market to work, thus removing the
need for rate base rate of return regulation to achieve efficient prices.7 In
the case of telecommunications, the bottleneck facility (circa 1980) was the
local network, and the Bell System breakup was about ensuring equal
access to that network by all long-distance carriers. By separating the Bell
System's long-distance carrier, AT&T, from the local network owners,
incentives were aligned to ensure that the owner of the bottleneck facility
would treat all long-distance carriers the same.
So, if full competition, A la airline or trucking deregulation, is not
possible, what is? Opening these bottleneck facilities so that entrants can
use them to challenge incumbents would appear to be an economist's
dream solution-the ultimate good idea. But what is the reality of access
regulation?
The first result is surprising, but on reflection, obvious: access
regulation does not get rid of rate base rate of return regulation; it simply
changes its locus from retail rates to wholesale rates. Even if retail rates can
be deregulated at the sweep of a hand, wholesale rates to potential
competitors cannot be deregulated. Regulation is now focused on the cause
of market failure, namely, the bottleneck facility. But, the monopolist still
has incentives to raise its rates to the fullest extent permitted by regulation
and to offer the minimum terms of trade with which it can get away. The
regulator must maintain her vigilance undeterred, but now the focus is on
wholesale rates.
There are three factors which may make access regulation even
worse. First, since competition will not arise instantaneously in the
presence of open access, it is very likely that regulation of both retail and
wholesale rates will continue through an undoubtedly lengthy transition
period. Second, if the interface between the owner of the facility and
potential competitors wishing to use it is sufficiently complex, then
regulation and monitoring of a complex business relationship, which one
party has entered under compulsion, becomes very complicated and
6. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412 (7th
Cir. 1995).
7. As a practical matter, virtually all regulators created price distortions away from
efficient pricing, allegedly for "social" reasons, or more likely, political reasons. Thus,
achieving efficient prices may not have actually been an objective of regulators, although it
is their oft-proclaimed goal.
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problematic. Third, if the owner of the bottleneck facility also competes
downstream with the firms who use its facility, then it has a positive
motivation to discourage its mandated wholesale customers from using the
bottleneck facility. If it cannot do this by raising its price, it will surely
reduce quality of interconnection, speed of installation, and high field
failure rates. At the time of divestiture, care was taken to ensure that the
retail long-distance unit was separated from the bottleneck-facility owner
so the local telephone companies would have incentive to carry all long-
distance traffic and not discriminate. Later policy changes were not quite so
discerning, unfortunately.
Telecommunications provides us with four great experiments aimed
at opening access to competitors of the incumbents' bottleneck access lines,
so it is natural to look at how these experiments worked in practice.8 The
examples were terminal equipment deregulations, the FCC's attempts to
open long-distance competition, the Department of Justice's opening of
long-distance competition, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996's
attempts to open the local loop. Of these four, I found two were successful
and two were failures. I conjectured then, and put it forward again today,
that success requires either one of two conditions be met: (i) the interface
between the entrant's business and the incumbent's business must be
simply and easily monitored for compliance; or (ii) the incumbent is not a
player in the competitive market against entrants. Unless at least one is
satisfied, I argue, attempts at equal access using incumbents' facilities are
doomed. We may really want it to work, and regulators will make mighty
efforts to assure it will work, but they will fail.
Case in point: making local-loop unbundling work in the aftermath of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It was both the intent of Congress
and the target of intense and sustained FCC efforts to open up the
incumbent local exchange carriers' (ILECs) local access lines to
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) who could then compete
against the ILECs for "last mile" services without having to build their own
access lines. Seldom have the forces of public policy in
telecommunications been as powerfully aligned as they were on the issue
of local-loop unbundling. And yet, the effort was a failure-the evidence
for which is the demise of the CLECs.9 The reasons for this failure are
clear: (i) the interface between the regulated monopoly owning the local-
access line and the CLECs who wished to use it was highly complex; and
(ii) the ILECs not only owned the local loops, they also competed in the
retail market for access services with the very CLECs who had to use their
8. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: the Telecommunications
Experiments, 15 INFo. EcoN. & POL'Y 73 (2003).
9. See supra note 7.
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facilities. The result was that ILECs had every incentive to make life
miserable for the CLECs in any way they could, and the complexity of the
interface gave them plenty of opportunity.'°
The lesson we draw from the history of access regulation in
telecommunications is that it simply will not work unless these incentives
and complexity issues are addressed. Otherwise, the evidence suggests such
efforts will end in costly tears and negative results.
Now, having made some very strong statements about the ability to
implement equal access, let me change tack by emphasizing that my
conclusions apply only to the domestic United States. Through some
unknown magic, forcing open access in France, Germany, Japan, and other
countries, especially for Internet services, apparently has been a great
success. Surprisingly, it was the United States and the FCC that sold the
concept of local loop unbundling to the world, and yet we are apparently
the only country that cannot make it work.
Why is this so? Frankly, I have no idea. My current hypothesis is that
in other countries, when the government tells you to do something, you do
it and you do it quick. In the United States, when the government tells you
to do something you don't want to do, you whine about how unfair it is,
complain to your congressman about how you are being picked on, you
bring suit against the FCC, and you almost never have to do what they told
you.
10. This is not to say that CLECs were otherwise efficient firms who were laid low by
ILEC regulatory machinations. The rather sorry story of the incompetence of at least some
CLECs is thoroughly explored in MARTIN F. McDERMOTT III, CLEC TELECOM ACT 1996:
AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT THE RISE AND FALL OF LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPETITION (2002).
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